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Executive Summary 
As it enters llle 21" century with on outstandjng loon portfolio ofTkl65 million lent to 
over 4,700 borrowers in one hundred brooches, the MELA program has amV¢<1 ut o 
IJ'allSition plateau in its evolution to a mature development fumnce program. It is laq,>e 
enough to havee lending history, significant cash Dow, and an emerging management 
capacity. On a practical and immediate basis, the two primary MELA constroints at this 
point are a shonage o( management mlent and a sbonage of loan capital. I to wever th~ 
oonst.rainiS are resa\ved, the progmm 1\.'\S dearly moved bey~md the "pilot pror,mm" stnl:',c 
while maintaining n high quahty loan portfolio throughout its history. 
However, in spite of its gro-wth it is still very much a child of the parent BRAC VO 
program. In almost all ways, MELA is still primarily defined by its historical roots, in 
that it is still very much a "large VO progr:un" offering standardized loan products ba.sc:d 
on the VO lending sl:nlcture, heavy empl!asis on collaternl and personal relationship 
ta\h<!r \hnn b\ls\nt':l:$ anal) sis, emphasi'l on volume and risk avoidance ta\bcr \han 
calculated risk management, and chamctcrized more by ccntrolizcd rule-seuing, rather 
than creative business strotegy. 
This stage is probably an unavoidable step in tbe e' olution of the MELA program. The 
central question is if MELA will grow beyond its historical constraints to ~orne a 
distinct and Jimdamentally different BRAC progrnm, focused on small enterprises 
serving extewal marlcets. The unanswered question is whether MELA will succeed tn 1ts 
stated goal of creating wage employment and net new income and employment for rural 
Bangladesh communities. While there ~s no reason that MELA should not be able to 
~w its s\ruclurnl fOOlS and cum:l\\ e,1)~lrain\S, ~re is also 1\\} guar-.m\~ \\\a\ il will 
successfully graduate (rom the current plntenu on which it c=ntly resides. 
Overall, the progmm is healthy as it currently exists, with a solid portfolio, slowly 
emerging regional management capacity, and a broad base of small business loans. The 
gap that currently exists is not in what MELA bas done, but in whm it has failed to do. 
As mentioned previously. the current program can best be described as a "large VO 
program" and as such is unlikely io have 1III)' signifiean\ economic impact wilhou\ 
significant chnnge. The current lending activity is msufficiemly focused and str.negic to 
have much more of an impact than shuffling income and employment from one 
community business to another. 
However, gtven the fact that M£LA.Iike all businesses, must evolve through successive 
stagc:s of growth, this current status is hopefully just a way-station on the road to a 
stronger and rnore well-developed future. Shorcbank's recommendations contained in 
Section rv are extensive and self~xplonatory, but the four major recommendations thnt 
justify special auent1on here are as follO\\S: 
1. MIS and Manno.cment Systems. MELA 's current MIS and portfolio analysu, 
procedures and capacity need to be significantly strengthened. The variety and 
complexity ofMELA risk is much more complex than VO !Ollll program risk, and 
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so MELA must significantly strengthen its MJS and management practices. MIS 
data ranging from scheme codes to iocreme!Ual job creation to repeatllOrro,~cr 
status needs to be incorpor:lled into a more te\'ellling 5YSII.:m of data analysis 
MELA management needs to itself become more proficiem at data analys~s. rather 
than relying on an MIS department that is ill equipped to perfonn the nec'"-ssary 
strategic analyses of trends. por1 folio, concentration, and other issues . 
• 
2. Program and Economic Development Strategy. MELA must create a program 
strategy llUlt has much more substance than the current ~grow volume and avoiu 
risk" behavior pauem. Faced with complex rural economic forces and 
competitive issues, absent n str.uegic and much more Lightly focused MELA 
program, ilio: lendin~ ac\ivi\ies \\ill oot ma\te any dl{\erence in \he economic 
health of rural communities. The cl!fl'ent unfocused drive to lend in all markets 
will insure that MELA will be successful in no markets. Elich MELA branch 
sbould lend to M mote than three business sttto~ llnlile its l~cr b:mkm\l. 
cousins that can succeed based on volume and sh~er size alone.. the MI!LA 
progrnm will only succeed on the strength and insight or its stmlegy, analysis and 
deeply informed market undemanding or the rural economic ·•value chain" 
J. Competitive Annl>'Sis and Product Line. Within the strat~ic context develop..--d 
io #2 above, the M ELA program drastically needs a much beuer understanding of 
the competitive context in which it is proposing to operate, and thus should 
embark on a scri;:s of market analyses that will help infom1 competitive strategies 
lllld product develorment. The currt:nt MELA loan pl'()(]uct o!Tering is a clone or 
the standardized aod bureaucratic VO loan program {which was designed to serve 
a much less competitive and complex market). The MELA product line needs 10 
be significantl)' more varied and market-driven if MELA is to be successful. 
4. Management and Staff Capacity Building. If MELA IS to reach its development 
impact potential, BRAC wilJ need to train its existing staff, as well as hire 
ndditiona\ POs wi\h t.cffi>\ I business b.ae\tgro\lnds and fresh p.:fSJICC\ivcs. 
Devclopmg the skill base of both the new and existing 'old school' sta!Tcrs will 
not be easy. llte lack of financial st. ills in current stafTis a very serious constraint 
on the ability or the progran\ to nmke business loans. WitiiOUt a ronsislet\1. 
emphasis on building the business and market analysis skills of loan officers. anti 
the strategic mnnag~mcnt & trnining ability or senior staff, the program will nut 
a~hieve its development impact goals. irrespective of bow much money is 
disbursed. 
The potenlial of the MELA program is greaf. and it has been a pleasure for Shorebank 
staff to be associated with its developmeru. We hope that the following pages are a 
useful and posiJive part or the cominuing dialogue concemi~ tllis program, and offer 
some useful ideas to BRAC ManagemenL 1\s alwa)'S, we are honored by the 
opportunity to work with BRAC, llt!d to help support BRAC's lcadl'rship role in 
c:cononlie de\lelopment 3nc.l microfinancc. 
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I. MELA Loan Portfolio Trends (1996-1999) 
A. Portfolio and Average Loan Size Growth 
• 
While the first seven MELA LOOI\$ were made in late 1996. MELA effectively began in 
1997, so it is still very much a young and emerging program. In spite of liS youih, with 
6500 loans made as of December \999, it is possible lo begin some subslamive analysis 
ofihe loan portfolio and 
program strategy. 1nat is 
ihe intent or this section 
of this report. As ihe chart 
to the right illustrates, the 
program has grown 
rapidly since early 1997 
to its year -end \999 
Tk165 million (S3.JMM) 
out..~tanding level. What is 
most interesting is not the 
fact that the port folio and 
program in general has 
grown, for tberc has 
never been 11 question that 
the .. large VO/sruall 
business" lending market 
was quite large, and could 
cenainly absorb all or the 
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MELA Pontono: Quar1erly Disbunemertts 
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funds thai BRAC MELA would be able to generate. What is more interesting is the way 
that lbe MEJ.A loan portfolio has m~erged in lern\S of other cluuacterislics besides 
50,000 
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simply volwne. 
One of the 
strongest trends 
has been the 
consistent 
IIIC~in 
avt:r.tge loan 
ill...:, incre-.c.;ug 
from Tk26,600 
'" 199610 
I K46,SOO as of 
ihe end of 1999. 
1\s will bt! 
discussed 
elsewhere, this 
i ncreasc in lo311 
size has occu~ withou\ a significant increase in delinquency. II is be\ievetl \hnt 1\us 
increase in loan size is a sesult of both the growing confidence of the l\IELA staiT/Iunding 
system ttnd tbc very stiong lllllrket demand in tllis loan segment. The irony is that, basct.l 
01\ inl«'o'iev.-s will\ r~eld sw.rr and Oislfitll'>Un.'\gtrs, ilie IMI'ktl dtml\1\\l ;., so Siron~ U\a\ 
were it not for the sti II very consen.111ive, VO..trained MELA slaff and the constraints or 
the MELA !~ding bureaucracy, this average loan size would be significantly grcaier, 
probably around Tk.l 00,000 or IUQCC. The CQl\Sttail\ls on th<: MULA lcndm~ portl'oliu at.:. 
stall' lending skills, ettlture and program design constraints that arc mtcrnalto llRAC', not 
external market constraints. 
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The cban above \u)s a single poim for elldl of the fl500 ME.I...A \031\S made since 
December 1996, organized by date. It not only shows the increasing intensity of total 
loan volume. but the irn:reasing number of loans that are made nt 'f'k50.000 :111d above. 
Percent Value of Disbursement by Loan Size lly Quarter 
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In a more 
summary 
fashion, lhc 
chart 10 lite 
lefi shows tl~e 
rncreasing 
conccntr.lliou 
or the tolnl 
portfolio 
oull;tandmg 10 
the Tl-50.000 
loan level. 
Spedlically, 
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6\% of the tolal disbursement volume in the founh quarter of 1999 were in loans of 
TkSO,OOO. This tm1d is even suvnger than suggested by lhe 61% figure. for 75% ofthe 
total value of disbursements was in lo.'Uls ofTk50,000 value or greater. 
Overall, this tn:nd is both positive and necessary, for if MELA is to achieve its stated 
goal of growing existing small businesses, new rum I jobs and wage employment, it must 
consistently i~rease iiS average loan size, eventually up to at least Tk 150,000. ThiS 
dramatic ponfolio growth must be nceomp;mied b) ., pamllel development of st<~IT. 
management and suat~ic capacity, for 1t is only through the ~velopment of strong 
mAnagement skiJJs focused on implementing a highly focused and str:uegic MELA plan 
will this program achieve its ~anomie devtlopment t,ooal~. 
B. MELA Borrower Profile 
ObibuJSement Amount vs. MembersfNon-Member 
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As the average loan size of the t..lELA lo010 bas evolved, so have the cbaructensucs of the 
MELA borrower. The primary shift with respect to MELA borrowers, as l>'Uggestcd by 
the: graph below, has been 10 mo\'e away from the VO Menibcr a.s a MPLA borrower to 
lhe Non-VO Menlber. This is natural nnJ not surprising, li>r the wcm majority ofVO 
Members have neilher the expericn<;e. skills or capitallo move beyond self-employmenl 
to the creation of job creating, wage-employment genemting small business Cirrus. 
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This slow but important evolution away from VO Members as t.ffil A borro11ers i!.alsu 
consistent with the fact thatl11e portfolio quality and past due loan data suongly SU&IlCSI 
thal VO Memb<:ts are much ht£,1\e~ risk MEL\ borro ... et"i lha1\ NUl\· VO ~lcmb.:t"i. a~ will 
be discussed in tbe loan credit qualil}' section of this rcpon. In the fourth quaner of 1999, 
67% ofM£LA loan disburseAnents v.ere made 10 Non-VO Members. 
Another key shift.that has been occumng wuh respect to the MELA Borrower has been 
with TeSpCc\ to lhe type of bus\ ness (sector} scheme code)1, as illtiSlrated by the graph and 
table below. From the "-arly days oflhe MliLA program. when 37"/o oftl~e loan volume 
Disbursement Volume by Sector 
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disbursed was in the Textile sector and only 4% in the "Other" (code 86) categ<~ry. the 
situation has been dramatically changed. A:> of the end Q( 1999, 55% ofloan 
disbursement volume arc now being made to the ~other" ca~egory, and only 16% 10 the 
Textile (code 81) sector. Unfortunately, given that the "Other" category is a catch-all of 
many types ofborro'''ei'S, it is impossible to say more ~-pecifically wh.-n business sector 1s 
responsible for the groWlh of MELA loans. Under the Recommendations section. 
Shore bank makes strong recommendlltions that this systc:rn of loan categonulion and 
scheme codes be sigililicanlly revised and improv"-d, so that it will enable management 10 
understand more clearly the nature oflhe MElA borrower, emerging markets, nnd risk 
chru:!cteristics across business sectors. 
loan Di$bursement vs. Sector vs. Time 
Textiles Cottage Transport Food Ag!'0-8a.sed Other 
Process in 
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C. StAga Of Growth •nd Bnmc;;h Produc:Uwlty 
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~ Given the ~ifie41lt difference in branch ages. it is not appropriate to compare 
the total disbursement across branches or the level of portfolio outStanding. 
> It may be useful, howcver. to atten1ptto understand the different lewis and sla&cs 
of MELA Branch productivity, as part of &.he larger process of understanding 
MELA Bf.mch evolution and maturation. The graph on the previous page 
attempts to show the ~productivity" of each of these differesu Sta~t.'S of MEl .A 
llrnnches, in tenns oftl~e disbursement per month per branch. 
What is surpris.ing and diSturbing about this annl}''SiS, however, is that the monthly 
productivity (disbursemeru per month) of tile Year 3 MELA Branches (llc208,000 
per month) is not significantly more productive (only 6o/e in1provemcnt} 10 tcm1s 
of loan disbursement value than the Year I Drat~ches (fkl86,000/month}. One 
·would expect that with gre:JU:r experience and more Stable customet relationships.. 
the: productivity per bmnch would be signi(icantly greater for Year 3 Branches. 
What is of further concem is the actual drop m productivity for Y t."llf 2 Branch..-s. 
The reason for this OYeralllack of significantly increased productivity IS unclear. 
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II. MELA Repeat Borrowers: A Mystery 
To be successful over lhe long tmn, Mtn.A should be filling a continuing and defined 
capital lending gap and should have satisfied customers. One imponant indicator of this 
success is lhat ME(..\ ''"'U\d bave a bigb "repeal borrower" 1111e. If MEl..A borrowers arc 
satisfied wilh the service and Joan product they receive from MEI.A, it IS unlikely th:ll 
they are facing only a single, one-time capitalru..>cd. lfther are growing. they will nC~:tl 
additional funds. If they are facing working capital needs, they wiU fuct: a conunuing 
need Any business with relatively high transacuoo & marketing costs-and Mtn.A is no 
exception-cannot sur"ive wi\hmn a high repeal wstomer rnte. 1\ low repc:a1 borrowet 
rote will insure that MELA \~ill be forever chasing "new'" borrowers, will have high 
outreach and marketing costs, will not develop a good reputation in lbe business 
community, and will have no enduring economic imp:u:L 
Un\ik~ \h~ VO progrnm, MELJ\ d<~<:S no\ ha"e a "<:a\)\i'Oe'' borrov.er pool !hat is ti\],h\ly 
defined within a village or community group. MELA faces a very large pool of possible 
borrowers, competition of varying characteristics and strength, and a more selective 
customer base. For Lhis reason. this Re\•icw has examined as best as possible lhe issue of 
repe<U borrowers for MELA. The results of this analysis are disturbing, for the MEL/\ 
rtpe;\l oorrov.~r rote iS less than it should be. This ana\~'SiS taises q~i<lru> tnat <.:an ooly 
be answered via a detailed and extensive ~lost, non-repeat'' borrower survey, for the 
information in the MIS system raises the issue ofME.LA repent borrowers, but docs ll\11 
offer any sigmficant insight into why lbe repeat borrower rate is RS low os it is. 
ln summary, the cepeat bonower mr.e is the best ovetall murket lest lbat should be 
measured, understood, and stmtcglcaUy rnatlllged by MELA Management. The only 
major exception is that if tbe MELA progmlll is shi fling its target mari.:J:t significantly 
Three-bme bonowe!S 
Two-trme borrowers 
1-r 
Analysis#1: Overall MEl.A 
IRe·pe<al f3oiTOWe111 (1996-1 
0 500 1.000 \,500 7.000 2.500 3.000 3.500 • 000 • .500 5,000 
from one customer base to another customer base, then those customers from the ftrst 
l!lnl'ket segment \'I."OUld not be returning to bonow again. for MELA was sbil\ing its focus 
and target markeL Developing some insight into this overall question is Lhe purpose of 
lbis So!Ction. 
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A. Analysis #1 : Overall MELA Multiple-loan Borrowers (1996-1999) 
The first Jeyel C7f8rullysis was to work WJlh lhe MIS Department to do a gross. overall 
nnnlysis. Since the MELA prob'1'1llll begnn. there have been 5,632 separate borrowen. 
(80"/, or 4509 are VO Members)'. As the graph on the previous paS<~ suggest$, of these 
5,632 borroweCI pnly 10% have mken more t1l3Jl one loan. Some have taken three loans 
(103 borrowers); some have lllken IY.'O IOMS (984 borrowers) and the rest have 1al.en only 
a single: MB.A loan (4,545 borrowers). 
These numbers and this level of gross analysis is insufficient 10 accurately understand the 
repeat borrower performance, for there are !\lELA borrowers that hnve taken out a IO:ln 
for \he fir.;\ \ime. in \999, so \hey have ool h:~d the opportunity to become a \'>...0 or lhrtt-
loan borrower. In spite of this caveat. hO\\C\'Cl', these numbers begin to mise the question 
of n."pe'Al borrowers, for they seem lower in total than one would ex peeL 
B. Analysis #2: Multiple-Loan Borrowers (1996-1998) 
The nut level of ana!ys\s Y.'\U be reslricte<l to ask in!', c. mote refill<!.~! and run-row qoostt~n· 
uofMELA borrowers that took out their first loan in 1996-1998, and have hnd sufficient 
time to payoff their 12/)8/24 month loan, how many ha\'e taken oul a S<.'t:Ond loan?" 
This analysis is more restricti\·e, for it does not expect a borrower who lOOk out a loan tn 
1999 to become n two-loan borrower (for a 1999 first-time OOrro\\'CI' cannot become o 
two-loan borrower untilstleast 2000!). This analysis compensates for longer·term 
s1ruetures, ami thus 
does not expect an 
eighteen·month loan 
borrower to become 
a repeat borro\\ ~r in 
less than 18 months. 
To bel'recise,lhis 
:rn31ysis \~'Ould bave 
10 do a borrow~r by 
borrower analysis or 
survey, and that is 
beyond the scope of 
this report. 
However, given that 
the MIS system 
does have a system 
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G One Tome aorrowerl 
a Repeal BorTOIWI 
Repeat vs. One-Time 
MELA Bo rrowers 
1!197..01 lll9TI02 1!197.103 1!197.00 lllilUII I~ 190SIQ) III>MlC 
10 specifically identify each specific borrower and loan. and that informnuou can be 
compared over ttme (1996-1999) on a mo11thly lhtsis, it JSsuggcsu:d that this analySts 1s 
aecurau; enough to raise a substantive que:.1ion aooutthe MELA repeat borrower issu.:. 
This analysis categorizes each borrower by the quarter that they first received a Mt:.LA 
loan, so as to see if there are shins in !he repeal borro\\cr behavior over time and since 
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the beginning of the MELA program. So, the data in the second quarter or 1997 show of 
the potcnti:tl repeat borrowers that took out their first MELA loan during 1997Q2, how 
many have taken Out a Second loan between that time and the end of [999, ~nd how JTIIIRJ 
JUSt took out a single loan in 1997Q2, and never took another MELA loan. 
As \he \hese two graphS s~g,g~l (see grnj\hs abov~ and be\1>w), i\ seems thM lhe 
consistent trend since aoont 1997Q:3 is that roughly 40.50% of!IIELA horrowcrs do not 
beromc repeat borrowers. Why lhis is the C:ISC is not known. ll1c folluwmg parngr.1phs 
suggest :some possible explanations. Inn they nre still WISati:;lactory, ami rnis.: mor.: 
questions than tmswcr. 
One possible answer is that MELA staff is selecting the wrong borrowers in the first 
place and making them their first loans only to discover thntthey are Jl(I(Jr credit nsks, 
and therefore not appro,•ing adtlitiunalloans. While tltis may b.; Ink:, it i!i not :mrportetl 
t-oy l!lc Ml:.l.A p<~rtf~;~IIU 
delinquency and overdue 
data (which is healthy). 
ronfolio t.-rcdit quality \lata 
does not suggc:.t suflictcnt 
loan quality problems that 
v.ould be consistctll with 
this cxplan;1tion of pot•r 
borrm~cr rcrayment 
pcrfonmmcc creating low 
rcp.:at ll<trn>wcr r.ttc:. 
Another pos:.iblc aJl!iwcr i::; 
thaJ Mf:l.A i~ :.hifting liS 
1'48TIQI 1ooTm ~103 19111~ '~' ~ IQIIIIjQl ~ borrower m;u\;c\ from some 
milia! customer group:.-uch 
as VO Members to Non-VO Members. This might be part of this dynamic, but if so it 
would suggest that after an initial .. shifl" in 1997, the repeat borrower role would be 
irn:rcasing, as the MELA borrower market was shilictlto th..: new marl.cl While tin.> is a 
more persuasive explanation than the preVlous credu quality aDS\\er, tlus IS sull not 
totally consistent with the steady drop-out rate of 40"1.., although 11 is possible if the target 
market were experiencing continuing fluctuation and change, still into I 999. 
Some MELA Dislrit\ Managers su~esled lim\ \he borrow~~. al\er having Iuken lnl!i.r 
first Ml!LA loan and understanding the effect of the MELA interest rate, chose to tul.e 
their future ftnanc•alneeds Lo another mstilution that offered lower or more llexihlo.: 
terms This may be possible, but to iJSSUJllc U1<1l the borrow.:r dues not umlcrst.md b.:li>rc: 
the first MELA loan is disbursed tbe competitive re-.dity of the lending n~arket and thdr 
ability to secure financing at other soun:cs for bcller terms (only to discQver it during the 
course of their first MEtA loan) seems not likely. 
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A ihinl possibility is that after ihe MELA borrower completes his or ber loan, there is no 
need for additional loan funds. While ibis is possible; it is unlikely . 
. . 
In any eveot, \he repeat MEL\ oorrower issue needs funber resean:h and explanation. 
and an ongoing management measurement process, for this is a lrey market test of the 
MELA program. A 40"/.o first-time borrower loss rate that persists over time is not 
healthy for the MELA pro~. unless it is a conscious ~ult of clear s(rntegic choices 
and is factored into the cost and performance projections for the future. 
Ill. MELA Portfolio Analysis 
Despite s1rong groMh m loan size, in 
btt.nebes, in membership aNi in \otal 
ponfolio outstanding (TPO) since 
MELA 's inception, ponfolio qualil)· 
remains s1rong. Overdue loans and 
portfolio at risk (PAR) as a perceru of tlle 
outstanding ponfo!io \n December 1999 
are 81 0.6% (Tk417 ,778) and 
2.34%(Tk3.6 MM) respectively. This is 
not surprising for four reasons. First, 
MELA lending officers and managers are 
all from B'RAC's RDP program where a 
strong risk-averse culture prevails. 
Second, MELA makes up a tiny fmction 
of the market, thus MELA POs are easily 
able to creanl the best cUSI'omers. 
Third, POs are lending primarily to local 
retailers whose businesses are easier to 
both fmd and analyze. And fourth, larger loans are only made to businesses with 
substantial collateral, and the loan sizes disbursed are far smaller than the businesses can 
profitably absorb. 
Comparison of Percent TPO and Percent Loans Made 
Across Members and Non VO Members 96-99 
70.00% .--------------til '!I. olloaneeSI 
60.00% 
• 'llo ofTPO 50.00% 
40.00% 
3000% 
21l.tml. t--
10.00% 
0.00% 1---
NonMember VO Member 
Allbaugh delinquency is low, it 1s still important to analyze why 11 is occurring, and 
whether there ore any pauems or cancentmtions of•risky' loans. Shorebank's five mam 
findings arc summarized in the following pages. 
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A. Most 'risky' loans are in the hands of former VO members 
~514 .--- ------- ----Since I 996, 40% of 
the value of all loans 
disbursed has been to 
Tom1tf VO membc:rs, 
Distribution of Principal Plus lllterest Overdue Among 
Members and Non Members Accross Sectors (96-99) 
• yet this group holds :llnli 
72% of nil loans at 
Tisk. It is likely that 
this is n function both 
of unsatisfactory 
borrower selection 
(i.e. not rejecting 
borrowers outright), 
as we\\ ns inadequate 
busilless analysis 
(especially in terms of 
cash flow and debt service covefllge) and monitoring. VO members have historically 
handled far less cash at any one time with more frequent repayment periods. 1l1e larger 
MELA loan disbursements arld the less frequent repayment period contribute to their 
inability to manage on time repayments. 
B. Most overdue loans are found in the 'other' category 
The .. other" 
category is made up 
-primarily of 
groceries, 6~ j"K of TPO n .% of Ourdue 96-99) 
restaurnnts and 
hotels. While it is 40'11. 
not surprising gi\fen 
the totll TPO in this llil1' -1 e o..wa..d..,-. &<tQI 'll • SeciOf ~as,. toe CNI:ftlue 
sector (S:W-}, we 
20Yo believe it should be 
lower given that 
10 .. these businesses are 
local retailers whose 
businesses should 0'11. 
be relatively easy to 
lraci$port F:OOd Agro·bfl:ed 
PC'OC:eU.IIft9 ~0..... 
analyze and 
monitor. 
"-F 16 
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C. The te,ctile secto.r has disproportionately more risk 
1be textile sector has 
disproportionately more 
risk (300/o of ovetdue 
loans) relative to its size • 
in tlle outstanding 
ponfolio (13%). Most 
(9%) oflhe risky textile 
loans have a term of !&-
months. Since late 1996, 
former VO members 
........ 
•• o&"4 
··-
...... 
..... 
r Olli~YO 
•: ......... 
make up 75"A. of th~ number of textile sector loans disbursed. Based on discussions with 
ten district managers, the band loom business is the DlOSl risky subsector in~~~ textile 
group. The food processing sector has a slightly higher nsk than its weight ofTPO. 
Agro-based and coltllge industries hold I&:SS risk relative to their \\eight in the ponfolio. 
Yc1., surprisingly, many district managers mentioned agro businesses as being one of the 
higher risk ~m:as LO lend in. The evidence, however, for the category as whole, does not 
bear this ou\. Cottage industry, a pfQdu«\vc sector w\th sig.nifi~t job crea\ion 
potentia~ has far less 'risky' loans outstanding (10%) compared with its weight in the 
TPO ( 15%). An efTor1 to grow this sector will improve both MELA profitab1lit) and it 
development impaCL ,_ ..... ,., __ .. ,_,_,_,,,... I 
..._.,..._....._k..._.. .............. 
D. Disproportionate 
concentration of risk in 
longer-term loans to VO 
members. 
All 'risk-y' 24 - month loans are 
in !he hands ofVO members. 
Non-YO members do not have 
any delinque~t loans in this 
.,_ 
·-
·-
·-.._ 
·-
·-
·-
IIWilltatl.,.._..., .......... _.._ 
----- - ---
-----
category, despite tlle outstandin~ 24-month portfolio being split mon: or less equaUy 
between these groups. 18-month loans show similar trends in !hat fanner VO members 
hoW three times as much or !he 'risky' portfolio in this category. The chart above shows 
that both members and oon-meotbers have roughly !he samt: oulstnntling taka in longer-
--
-
·-·-::1-
·-f -
.. -
·-
,_ 
·-·-] L ·~ ............ 
tenn loans. Thus, nil else 
being equal, we would expect 
these larger busmesses to 
display similar delinqu<!llCy 
trends. The chart above shows 
this is not the case. The 
problem is not simply one of 
proponionatety higher 
delinquency in longer tenn 
loans (as the table below \\IOuld suggc;n). Rather, il n:sts with both boiTO\\Ct selection 
and the suucturing of the longer term debt to fit lhe naUJte and cash Oow of the bu:;iness. 
It is not clear, for example, why a viable grocery business would require IS-month terms. 
Yet. the data shows us that over 25% of all IS term loans are gOing to retail busirlesllCS in 
Sectorwlse Dispersion of Loans Across Term 96-99 
the "other' category, which 
compris¢5 primarily of 
groceries stores, restauronts • 
and hotels. It is likely that 
both the loan size and the 
term of the loans to these 
stores contn"bute to the 
incidence of delinquency. 
The textile business make!. 
up another 10% of IS-
Sector 12 month 18 month 24 months GrandTOial 
Texttle 867'Y. 4 03% 042% 13 12% 
Cottage 10.70% 4.31% 0.21% 1522% 
Transport 113% 0.50% 000% 163% 
Food Processing 761% 2.78% 006% 1044% 
Agrobased 5. 16% 1.56% 004% sn% 
Other 42.29"/o 974% 079% 5282% 
Grand Total 7556% 22.91% 1.53% 10000% 
month loans. If the loans are to powcrloom businesses, this makes sense. lfthey an: tu 
tailors, it does not. MEI..A POs need to rec:eive more uaining on loan stntcturing. and 
tnilor the loan structure to the fmancial dynamics and needs of the business. 
Dispersion of Longer Term Loans Accross Sectors 
10.00% 
8.00% 
6.00% 
<1.00% 
000% 
Textile Collage 
J
• 18 month I 
• 24 months 
Transport Food 
Processmg 
Agro based Othet 
E. Smaller loan sizes (<Tk45,000) have proportionately higher 
delinquency 
This surprising finding has a MELA 
corollary: larger loans(> Tk50.000) 
have relatively lower delinquency. 
Even more startling is that, in 
Loan Size 
PAR 
% TPO 
20-26,000 30-45.000 50.000 >50.000 
7.00% 33.00% 53.00°k 6.00% 
4.90"k 26.69"k 57.50% 10.91% 
absolull: lcrms, there is 6% or value or delinquent loans in the above Tk50,000 category 
and ~/o in the> 'fk25,000 category (see adjncc:nt table). All delinquent botro\\t:rs in the 
<Tk25,000 Loan size group ;rre members. In the >Tk50,000 loan size group. dclmquency 
i.s event) split between mo:mbers and non nu:mbers. 
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The chart shows 
that since 1996 
loans disbursed 
to borrowers 
with a loan size 
below Tk45,000 
have carried 
more risk 
rehllive the 
ami>Un\ 
disbursed in the 
71UXI%r- -
1 Oispetslon of Delinquent 
BO ~ • Loans At;ross Loan Size 96-99 
so~ 
40~ 
20-25.000 3Q..4.5.000 60.000 
l8 PAR • •t..wo 
>60.000 
sanle loan size category. The table shows which sec:lon; have the most delinquent 
outstanding (!aka) among borrowers who received a loan ofTk45,000 or below. The 
tnbJe below shows that most of !he value of the delinquent loans in lhc < Tk50,000 -
disbursement size category is in lhe bands of non 
members. 
Based on extensive discusstons with MELA field 
statT (I 0 district managers) as well as a ''isit to 
two branches lead Shorebank to believe that 
irustne.~ analysis (If Members is not sufficient. 
Good charncter is nota substitute for being able to 
PAR !>ispersion Across Loan slm < Tk 50.000 
T t!lCtile 6 60% 
catage 8.49% 
Transport 0 28% 
Food Processu-g 5 62".(. 
/'qo based 2.10% 
other 17 18"A> 
manage a larger cash now It is likely that certain members should never have ~'Cdvetl 
MELA loans in the first instance (i.e. a borrower selection problem). Even 'small loans' 
an: substantially larger than what members have ever handled in the past. h is unlikely 
that borrowers can immediately ;~bsorb the full loan nmount, and diversion of fund:; 
results. Fund diversion was cited by both head-office nnd field stnlT as another cause of 
Lo<ID SiZ!:l PAR- !!/on Member 
20000 0% 
25000 0% 
30000 w. 
35000 1% 
40000 2% 
45000 0% 
%l~IPAR 4% 
PAR - M em!l!:£ 
3% 
4% 
12% 
1% 
14% 
2"4 
36% 
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Total PAR 
3% 
4% 
13'11. 
2% 
16% 
2% 
~ 
detinque~y. Moce 
careful analysis ofloan 
use and appropriate 
loan size is needed. 
Where loans are mado:, 
more frequent 
repayment periods (e.g 
hi·\\.e.J"kly) will reduce 
cash now risL 
IV. MELA Program Recommendations 
A. Management Information System 
M pr=\, \he MELA MIS Sys\em is primarily a loon a\:couming system n\\her \Mn an 
MIS system !hat suppons managemem analysis and decisions. To suppon the current 
operolions and future suatcgic uccision.uaking ofMI~LA Manngcancnt, thi!i MIS Sy~h .. '1ll 
must be fundtunentally strengthened, and the ability of MELA Mrumgement to analy:L<: on 
their own the MIS dat.a must be signi licantly improved. The list of recommendations 
below w\11 complement (not felllate) the more standard key indi~oi and monthly \rend 
reporting that MELA should be generating, much along the same lines ofBRAC's RDP 
VO lending program. 
(I) Schen1e code information. It is a cenainty that the risk and performance of 
MEl.A loans will vacy from one. industcylbusioess sector to another; it al:>o a 
certainty that the economic impact of one sector is quite different from another 
sector. For both of these reasons (risk management and economic impact 
assessment) it is very impoT1anltO lniOk in useful detail the type of business being 
supponed by the MELA loan. The current system of scheme codes is not 
effective, and "ha.t eiTcctiveness it has is being quickly crocled as the 
concenlmtion ofloons m the "other~ category increases. 
As v.'aS recommended in the 1998 BRAC Donor Review, it is necessary that the 
current scheme code be redesigned and all loans be re-calibmted to the n~w 
system There should not be a single sector that has more than I 0% of the loans. 
The ·'other" category must be broken apart to reflect more precisely the loans tn 
the category. To better wulerstand the economic impact of the MELA pn1gram, 
there should be a more aeeumte description of each type of business. and at l~t 
twenty scheme code/sector cntegories should be developed to reflect the nature of 
the MELA supponed businesses. 
(2) Interest and Principle Tracking. The current MIS system does nottmck 
separately past due interest vs. past due principle. Til is lack of clarity and cle-ar 
flaw in the MELA MJS system is surprising in a lo::nding Mfl organization of 
BRAC's experience, and should be remeillC4.1 quickly. Withotu this detail. it ili not 
possible to det\.'rmule portfolio at risk, past doe interest, arul other key 
management data. All loans most be recalibmted to bring the MIS database up to 
date with this new information for all loans. 
(3) Repeat Borrower Status and Borrower Credit Quality. Eacl1 separate borro\\-cr 
should have an MlS tmcking process that c:~tegorizes the borrower with tespecl to 
scheme code, repeal status (how many loans they bn\-e r. .. -ceh-ed), dday time 
between loans received, and an overall roting c>fborrower credit qualit)·. 
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(4) Jolt and Employment Information. The cum:nt job and employment infonmstion 
~essential!)' useless for any analyucal or management purposes. A nso,OOO 
loan to two businesses, one "ith fifty employees and another with live: empll)yces. 
arc clearly very different lnlnsactions with different economic impact. and the role 
of the MELA funds are vel)' different from bolh businesses, butt he MIS :~y~t.:m 
suggests that the MEL.A funds ha\-e ·'created" five employees with one loan :and 
fifty employees witlrthe other loan.. What is essential i5 to track employment 
information that has meilning. rather than just fills a burenw:r.uic MIS sloL 
There is a strong necessity io track dilTcrenttypes of CJT1plo)ment infommtion· (a) 
what is the total employment of the company; (b) what additional en1ploymcm is 
supported by the MEl.A loan {reality, not wisllfulthinldng}, and (c) what is the 
employment &rowth of the MELA supported business over time. Ench ofth .. -,;c 1s 
a different dalll field. The first two data ficlds arc entered once only, when the 
loan is initially entered or disbursed. The third Iield is updated every six month~ 
ora year, so that BRAC can track the growth(ordemise} o[the cnterp£ises that 
the MELA program supports. If it is deemed necessary by BRAC Management, 
two additional data fields can be entered when the loan is disbursed: percent of 
employment that is part-time vs. full-time., and pen:ent employment that is female. 
What is most important is the incrl.'mtmtal or rlllltginal impact of the MELA 
funds-what jobs arc created as a result ofMELA funJs, and what is the growth 
of the MELA-supported enterprise over time. The goal is to support growing 
employmenl growth, and \he MIS syt.\em must uack. \hal pn:K.ess. 
(5) Competitive Lending Information. The MIS system needs to help inform MilA 
Management :~bout compeutive issues, ami so each loan (\\hen dbbursed) should 
include info11l'la\ion about o\her soUJces of lonn fund:; used by \he Mhl.A 
borrower. A llexible number of fi~.:lds in a linr.ed data file should code nntl tr.Jcl.. 
the specific other banks or banking system~ will help describe what other kinds of 
fonnal sources of funds the MELA borrower is utilizing: Islamic Bank, Agrani 
Bank, specific other non,profn l\11'1 lenders, tlc. 
(6) Use of Funds. The level of risk varies greatly among different types of uses of 
MELA loan funds. Working capital, ri:ok and le..1ding structure dieTers 
significantly from the purchase of production equipment or the puteha:.e of a 
building or a seasonal capital need. These different uses must be cntegorizcd and 
each loan when disbursed must be categorized as to the primary usc of funds. If 
possible, the generic term ....,.,.orking capital" should be avoided, for it is so general 
as to ofien not be usefuL More spccilic terms such as pun:base ofinvc:ntol)' or 
supporting receivables should be uSed. 
(7) Management Data Review. Head office MELA management should review the 
results of this infonnation on a monthly basts wnh each Distnct Manager, for 
discussion, verification, nnd analysis. 
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(8) MIS Depanmem vs. MELA Management Role Clarification. There is some 
potenti.'\1 confusion on the difference between the roles of the MIS Department 
vs. the role of MELA Management. Too many times during th1s MI.! LA n:v1ew. 
when questions of analysis, strategy, information or policy arose in the 
conversation the answer or strong refcn:m:e was made to the "MIS 
Depanmeot''. This crutlcad to confusion. It is certainly the role of the MIS 
department to collet:t data and infonnation. store it accumtely and completely, 
and create the capacity to genemte standard repons. 1t is not the role of MIS to 
do analysis, to "answer questions", or to do any type of manngcnumt or 
analytical analysis. This is not their skill base or the1r role. M EI.A 
1\ 1anagernent needs to be able to develop tht capacity to use easily available 
software such as Microsoft F.xcel to analyze the downloaded MIS database.l 
(9) Ponfolio at Risk. Sufficient data fields should be added to the 1\US tmd..ing 
process to allow an analysis of total ponfolio at risk. 
(I 0) Producth·ity and ProfitabilitY lnfonnation. Since MELA is plamting to grow 
into a very large program relalivc:.ly quickly, collecting and n113lf't:JOg progmm 
wide infomunion on costS and profitability bt."CCmes very imporumt for heaJ-
office managers. Since all costs are fixed at the head-office level. this is less 
intponant for day-to-day branch management. Sl1orebank does suggest, 
however, that branches construct their own income statementS and tmck their 
profilllbility monthJy. Productivit) infonnal.ion and analysis {lo:tns per PO; 
portfolio yield per branch etc.), howc\."er, is critical at the branch level and a 
system should be set up to regularly calculate key ratios and trad~ performance. 
Finally, reports that c:ruilile management to analyze branch performance as a 
group of branches age (Yr I branches vs. Yr 2 e1e) wiU be useful in rollin~ out 
and budgeting for new branches. 
8 . Program Management 
(I) f>rogrnm Manal!ement. MITLA must have strong :md I 000/o dcdiau.cd 
Je:~dership if it is to accomplish its mission of enterprise creation, economic 
development, and job creation. The proximity of tht: MELA prow-am to the 
sttong cu\\llra\ ~mngnet'' of the VO program makes it difficuh for the MELA 
progmm to develop along a different pnth, ttnin for different sl..ills, usc diffcre.~u 
risk analysis techniques (business cash now, not just collateral), and overall 
create a lending program that bclulves very dilTerently than the existing BRAC 
VO program This suggests bringing in staff e:-;temal from SRAC, and 
developing l'llllllllgement strength totally dedieatl!cd to MELA. 
Senior management should ha\'e a background and expenise in small businGSS 
operations and lending. lt is more important that this person haw small 
business expenise than lending expertise; lending skills and analysis can be 
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learned. but ~instinc&s'' about small bu.sinos oper.uions. lllllrl.eting and 
competili\-e forces ~re much, much hankr to acquire ,.ja training. 
(2) Sta[TOOning, MELA Di~trict Managers and l..endin~ Officers (l'Osl n-.-.:J 
troining m competitive market analysis, and cxtmctin~: nod nnal)£Jng bu~1111.~!> 
financial and market infom1ation from busin~~ that do oot l.«p formal 
records. This is a' far more difficult job than that of a regular bank officer, who 
walks into a busin.:ss and is ~ted with a set of financial statcm.:nb hi 
analp..e. Constructing cash now stalmlcnb to undcrsund a borru\\cr'5 capacuy 
to repay a loan is essential for any loan decision th.it i:; oot based purely on 
collateral or character. Cash is highly ftmgible among ~1El.As taq;etcd 
borrowers, monng towards the most pressing n .. -.:d of the moment. Shorebant.. 
believes that it is 8 primary job of each Distri.:t Mnna~cr to troin and mentor his 
loan officers. Troining :;hould thus be provided to Distnct Managers, nnJ 
po.s:;ibly to the live top performing POs in high potential areas. 
As part of the trairung, Shorebank advises tbat the old loan application form 
~hould be redesigned. and that POs are &JVCO (and troincd in) a form that ''ill 
assist their business analysis. rather than confusing it. 
(3) Competitive Analy=. Ml!l.i\ man:1gcment must comm1ss1on a sc:ric~ of 
competitive an:~lyscs thnt are focused on undcn.tnnding the compelllivc 
environment for the MELA produc&s. These: analyses may vary between 
District, but should be created to understand the lending envlltlnmcnt in detail, 
nod to help guide MELA m:magement in i&s eOorb to find the appropri;llc 
market and development niche for the: MEI.A program. At pres.:nt, 1~ i) a 
significaru lad;. of t..nowledb'C about the com(ll!llll\ c ~and environment 
that MD..A faces. and this ~nying in the dark'' "illoot be helpful to program 
&fO\\th and impact. 
(4) Product Analy~is. A similar competitive ond market ~tudy needs to be dune for 
each of MFLA 's current produc&s. The current rroduct lineup is a sh:(ll;hild of 
the VO lending str.llegy and history, and is ill suited to the M8..A lending 
market. Much greater tmdersUlllding of the financial 01.'eds of MELA' s target 
borrowers needs to be de~ eloped. 
C. New Product Development 
While a standardi7.ed, cool\ie-cuuer product IS appropriate for the majonl) of BRA.c's 
VO lending market, MELA lends to 8 far wider range of businesses with different rbk 
profiles. much more competitive JlR.'SSures, and very d1fferent financial needs. Needs 
vary accord1ng to a busmesse's stage in its life cycle (swt·up, vs. rualure), the sc:.:tor in 
which it operates, and the w;c of the loan proceeds. While it is wise not to O\·erlo;aJ a 
new program with a wide ronge of products wh1ch '1-ary with respect to tcnn, price, site, 
repayment schedule, and incenthcs, MELt\ management should ensure thilttl..: 0\.'C\1) of 
its primary wget marlet an: gelling met by i&s product offcnng. The standard ·vo loan" 
thai only varies with term is not sufficient to Stf'•e or compete well i.n the MJ!LA mari..ct. 
lfMELA is specifically targeting agro-based industries, for in.stancc, it should be offering 
11 seasonal product to meet the needs of these borro\\Crs. For manufacturing eqwpmcnt, 
for instance. the terms should be much longer. If not, one oflwo things will occur the 
inappropriately structured loan will result in higher borrower delinquency, or the busmess 
will simply go elsewhere for capital that is more appropriately structured . 
• 
Similarly, ifMELA wants to retain its top performing 'gold card' borrowers, it should 
reward them (e.g. a reduced interest rate for repeat borrowers who pay evel) installment 
on time). Finally, to remain the financial institution ·of choice' among borro\\crs, 1111'1 .A 
should ensure that tiS price is competitive, while not compromtsmg the suslilinabtlity of 
its program Two product sUggestions emerging from our diSCUSSlons with D•strict 
Managers are highlighted below: 
(I) Short Term Lending ProducL ro meet a clearly stated mari:et need, as defweJ 
by interviews with the MELA District Mll!lllgers, MELA should develop a 
short-tenn (six month) loan product. Al present. the one-year loan does not fit 
tht;se shorter term, seasonnl financing needs, and there is a high penalty in tt:nns 
of a very high effed.ive interest rate should 11 one-year loan borrower decide to 
pay off the one year loan in six morttbs. 
(2) F~xible Pavment Terms. There is a market need for flexible payment lt.'rrnS 
with n:spe<:tto teml or paytnent schedule. This should be considered as part or 
the market and product market analyses suggested above. 
D. Portfolio Management 
I) As in the CjiSC of the RDP VO program. a series of key portfolio volum~:. 
qwllity, and productivity indicators should be trn<:kcd on a monthly ba,;is. The 
current set of MELA portfolio reports are inadequate, and don't evert meet the 
standard set by the VO program. 
2) The aging of the portfolio o11tstanding is particularly critical. both across sectors 
and ocross districts and branches. Currently, the only piece ofinforrnation 
head-offi~e ltllUla\)e(S lta,·e is th.: absolute amount overdue at Ute dU.trictl.:wl 
There is no management report on concentrations of del inquene)· among 
members or non-members, bety,een sectors. across Joan sizes, within different 
loan teem catc&ories. or within sped ftc distncts or bmnchcs. 
3) Delinquency should be analyzed in any sub-sec10r category that has either I O~o 
or tuore of the total portfolio outstanding or is particularly risky. The analogy in 
the RDP program would be breaking out rural trading into smaller sub-sector.. 
because it has most of the TPO (and, thus :1 high percentage of riJ.L.y loans) rul<i 
analyzing risk in the housing sector, because of the traditiorullly higher 
delinquency in this sector, even though it has Jess than 4% ofTPO. 
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4) The cottage industry sector holds a disproponionately lower amount of 
delinquent loans, while having significant development impact potential. As 
such, MELA management should seek to grow this sector and understand the 
~nslraints facmg battowers. 
5) BRAC should conduct a field investigation into the higher risk in the textile nrea 
(handloorns) as well as the smaller grocery sto~ that have delinquent 
harrowers. FlnaUy, Members' businesses should be as carefully scrutinized as 
non-members should. 
E. Strategic MELA Focus and Risk Management Capacity 
Sectoral Focus. Overall, MELA mnnagement should adopt a process whereby 
mdividual branches develop a much tighter s..>ctoral or industry focus. At present, 
there l'S cxueme di\•ersily and spread in \he marke\:s \hal the M£\..A branch~ are 
attempting 10 serve. ~Jack of all trades, Master of None." 
Such a spread among divergentmnrket segments will insure !hat the brooch level 
MELA staff wil I be unable 10 develop significant market, business or risk analysis 
knowledge or depth, for they are suempting to cover far too many market segments. 
Increased MELA Loan OOicer skill depth and experience-much desired by Senror 
BRAC Management-will be virtu:Uly impossible to altain, re~"-!'dl~ of U1e 
amount of training offered to the MELA staff, without focusing each bmnch's 
MELA lending ponfotio and rargel market Only with a strategic focus by each 
branch can there be any possibility of economic impact. skill and expcnise 
developmeru by staff, Increased risk managen1ent slilll, and lowet overall 
transaction costS. 
As long as each MELA branch and 1'0 LS covering mlllly marketS, they will be 
frustrated in their attempts and abiliry to develop ski I~ market knowledge, and 
strategic impacL Without tighter focus, MELA will similarly be unable 10 develop 
a market presence or a successful competitive advantage in the small business 
\endin~ market. Trying \o compele in all markets ~ lack of e<)mpe\itwe 
success in any market, but unforturuttcly Ibis is the currcm strategy of the MELA 
program. This Jack of focus will insure thai these brunches and the MELA program 
will remain a "large VO lending program", with limited if any economic impact, DO 
ability to manage risk, no competitive advanrage, reliant on collatct'lll based lending 
Gust like the banks), and will experience a constant chum or turnover ofborrowers 
due to being thinly-spread, reactive nnd not proactive lenders. 
It is not suggested that each branch have only a single MELA market focus. bur no 
more than three market segments or scheme codes should compri:>e each branches 
loan portfolio. This will imply thnt the MELA PO must learn to and be able 10 say 
"Nor• to possible borrow~ fol \hey vri\1 fall outside of \be seltttcd focus. This 
will be bard if Senior BRAC Management is pushing for "volume, volume" and 
"profitability", and not pushing for strategic focus. impact., and depth. So long as 
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BRAC Management does not reinforce the goal of strategy, focus and depth, the 
MELA program wi!l continue to be a '·farge vo~ lending program. with liule to 
differentiate its v1.due added or ecoDOmic impact or 4lbility to manage risk. 
F. Developing a MELA Financial Model 
>- On a general basis, S!wreballk believes then: ls no question given the relative size! of 
the MELA lending market, increasing average loon sizes, DJ1d the small overhead 
required to suppon the progtam. tbal MEL\ can he a self-sustaining protrram if 11 c3ll 
acquire sufficient capital. 
~ In spite of 1hM realii'J, BRAC still need~ to o-eate a flnan<:ial model for MELA \O help 
project out alternate prognutt scenarios. 1l1e model wilJ help ORAC understand 
capital needs, manage cash no" at the bmnch level, and whether the progrnm is 
bavtn~ the desired impact_ A model will also allow BRAC to test the impacl of 
different program and product designs (interest rates and fees, tenn, loan size, s~IT 
ratios, the provision of technical assistance, repayment schedules) on program 
sustainability and pc:.rformance. 
As always, the model will only be as useful and IICCUTllte as the input information. 
There was not sufficient time during this visit to design the model and acquire the 
detailed branch level and program information to create a useful modeL Shoreb:mk 
recommends that it work with BRAC senior management to develop a set of base 
assumptions. which are necessary to make any model construction meaningful. 
:;. To create this model, at least the following in(Omlal.ion will be necessary. Some of 
this infonrultion is "fact" in that it defines whstlhe program costs & ratios are at 
present; others are "variables" \hat can be modified to help develop alterruut pro &Jam 
projections (loan strUcture, interest rate mix., etc.) 
o MELA Bl\\l\th l~el costs for s\li.II, direct overhead nnd all~d 
overhead expenses, as well as regional/district level costs that are 
necess-ary to suppOrt the MELA progrnm.. 
a lnitial assumptions about the loan to Taka to PO sta.IT ratios. 
a Head Office expenses that are necessary to support the MELA program, 
ltod any allocated HO expense. by category 
a The different MELA loan product information: term, interest rate and 
payment structure, projected loss rates per sector. 
o Anticipated staff turnover behavior, projected sectoral concentration. 
o Projections of capital raising capacity- it will not be useful to create a 
model for a TKl.OOO miUion MELA program if the expected capital 
raising capacity is only TK 400 mill ion, for instance. 
a Initial esumates of loan amount per job created will help to begin the 
modeling process for economic impact. 
Appendix 1: Sample MELA Management Reports 
11 is beyond \he scope ohhls repon to detai\ \he total rn!'I(?.C of management TepQrts the 
ME1..A MIIDIIgement should develop end use momhly to effectively ITilUUige the MELA 
program, but the following are indicative of the nature and detail of the reports necessary 
to support a higher level of program and analysis and strategic munagernenL 
• 
These reports below do not include the "standard" Portfolio MaruJgemcnt Reports that are 
familiar to all BRAC MaruJ~?,emenc portfolio outstanding. disbursements, past due, credit 
quality, TPO al risk, etc. These portfolio quality and volume reports are stnndard and 
represent nothing new to BRAC, but, nonetheless, reports of this nature should be 
developed for MELA. Tb~ trend reports should have nll the key indicators and ratios 
that enable a manager to determine the: pcrfonnance of a branch or district over time 
The reports described below arc not loan accounting reports but more of~Portfolio 
Strategy and Management" reports that have a bigher level of analysis than just "What is 
the MELA portfolio and bow much ofit is later' type of reports than familiar to BRAC 
All of these reports can be either produced by the MIS department or by MELA 
Management using Microsoft Exce\ and, wi\h practice, should W.e no more \han one or 
two days per month to produce. Again. these reports listed below are only indicatioos of 
the type of reports that should be developed: they are not a total list with detailed 
recommendations., but rather indicative of the type of analyses that should be perforrntd 
monthly :utd dis~ \\ith the MELA District Managets on a regul11r basis. 
A. Portfolio Concentration and Trend Reports• 
10-30K 3s-.st< 50K 50K+ Ave.ra e Loan Sire 
1996/04 75% 2~ 0% O'llo 26,667 
1997101 60".4 28% 11% 0% 29,138 
1997/02 51% 25% 1~ 10% 31.870 
1997/03 62% 23% 12o/o 1% 28.663 
1997/04 67% 2.2% 9% 0% 27,500 
1998/01 57% 26% 11% 4')(. 30,548 
1998/02 61'*' 18% 20'llo o•J. 30.093 
1998/03 37% 20% 40% '" 35,752 
1998/04 27% 24'11> 45% 2% 38.721 
1999/01 2]'1(, 26% 41% 4% 38.918 
1999/02 26% 21% 46% 4% 39,248 
1999/03 17% 18% 56"$ 7% 42.911 
1999/041---:::'=:'";.;:--7.14=:%7---'6'==1="~-1c:;3:;;%;-----.4~6~,860~ 
Total 25% 19% 47% 7% 26,667 
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Loan Amount Disbursed by Quarter by Sectors 
Textlle Cottage Transport Food Pnx:e• Agro-base Other Gralld Total 
1997/01 37% 11% 13% 4'4 3% 32% 100% 
1997/02 36% 15% 9% 14% 2% 24% 100% 
1997103 i~ 20% 5% 13% 4% 35% 100"4 
1997/04 27% 16% 5% 14% 7% 31% 100% 
1998101 23% 34% 3% 19% 9% 13% 100'4 
1998102 2~% 21% 2% 23'l4 B% 2'% 1<10% 
1998103 22% 18% 3% 19% 10% 29% 100% 
1998104 28% 12% 1% 12% 6% 40% 100% 
1999101 11% 36% 2% 12'4 7% 32% 100% 
1999/Q2 13% 14% 3% 11% 7% 52% 100% 
1999103 12'llt 16% 2"4 10"/o 7% 54% 100% 
1999/04 13% 14% 1% 10"/o 7% 55% 100% 
Gr.~nd Total 16% 17'4 2% 12% 7% 46% 100% 
(When appropriate. this report should be revised lo match the expanded 
an<!. more detailed sectoral schem~ su~ed) 
B. Borrower Profile Reports 
Quarter ' Non-Member Members Non-Member Members Total 
1996104 ll'll. 100% 160.000 160,000 
1997101 2% 98% 30.000 1,660,000 1,690,000 
1997/0 .2 19% 81% 680.000 2.985.000 3,665,000 
1997103 6% 94% 325,000 5,465,000 5,790,000 
1997104 3% 97'llo 260,000 1.no.ooo 8,030,000 
1998101 8% 92% 765,000 8,430,000 9,195,000 
1998102 7% 93% 655,000 9,065,000 9,710,000 
1998103 17% 83% 2,200,000 10,635,000 12,835,000 
1998/04 11% 89% 2,715,000 2 1,060,000 23,ns,ooo 
1999/01 17% 83% 3,555,000 16,760,000 20,315,000 
1999/02 39% 61% 15,915,000 25,295,000 41,210,000 
1999/03 61% 39% 29,870,000 19,220.000 49,090,000 
1999/04 68% 32% 58,245,000 27.790.000 86,035,000 
Toul 41% sa•r. 115,215,000 1 56,295,<100 271 ,510,000 
{This report Is for lotal disbursement, is should also be done forTPO) 
1997/01 1997/02 1997/03 1997104 19g81Q1 1998/02 1998/Q3 1998104 
One Time 38% 59% 52% 44% 44% 45% 34% 4 1% 
Borrow 
Repea 62% 41% 48% 56% 56% 55% 66% 59% 
Borrowe 
(The repeat borrower an.Uysis should be done Ior sectors, districts und branches, ln 
discern trends and il;sues.) 
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Appendix 2: Insights From Field Interviews 
A. Market Information 
~ There is an' insufficiently informed perception of market c~mpetition. Slllff 
under.aandslhatlhtte are competitors, and understand some of lhc reasons that 
borrowers prefer other lenders vs. MELA (interest rate, flexibility of payment 
terms, shoner term products, etc.) as well as some of the potential competitive 
adV8Ilk'!.gCS ofMELA (lack of corruption, speed of response). Ovaall, howevt'r, 
the understanding is not an organized understanding of market forces, but more 
infumutl and ad hoc, artd Oms not useful to develop strategy and policy. 
> Overall, there is not an organized understanding of the competitive advantage-
31:tnal Of potential-f()r the MEI..J\ program. Absent such 11 strate~tc analysts and 
understartding, each branch and district will deal with competitive issues in an 
uncoordinrued and uninfonned manner, which will not be successful. 
)> District Martagers believe that they could increase their volume si~nifi<::Ultly with 
some cllanges; (a) the development of a shon-tenn (six month) loan product, or 
the ability to pay off a longer term loan early without an interest rate penalty (as is 
cum:ndy the case); (b) being able to lower the cost of the mongagc filing, as a 
result of being approved as n linanci:ll institution by the Bank of Dangladesh; (c) 
incn:asing the OM loan approval authority to TkiOO,OOO. 
>- While in some areas, some banks arc not inten:sted in smaller loans, in other 
areas, the District Managers gave examples of other credit suppli.ers. Overall, 
however. \bere is msufficiem rompe\i\\ve information \o make any mrormtd 
judgment except to state that there is competition to MELA. 
~ There is no sense of program, ponfolio or compeulivc focus for the branch~ 
they are responding to any and all potenlial and credit-wonhy borrowers, in ll~e 
desire lO increase volume. This wiU effectively defeat the development Of any 
competitive strategy or inaeased economic impact. 
B. Portfolio Delinquency 
Although they were uncomfortable to talk about it. MELA POs were aware of the higher 
delinquency :unong M4!nlbers. They attnbuted it to; (a) a lack of other sources of cash to 
draw on during 'difficult' times; {b) an inability of llte membcr 10 handle a larger loan; 
(c) diversion of funds imo other activities; (c) inadequate analysis of the business; and (f) 
poor borrower selection. due 10 the 'good character' reference from the VO program. 
I ll_lg_btr Rl$k Businm 
I Handloom (T exule) Oil Stcd (Food Proccssin~ 
IAgo&sed~ 
Problems borrowers fac~ 
Oleapcr imported goods from competitors; t\pensTYC impomd 
inputs 
Seasofuluy of busiDCS:s; difficult to get stock or inpuu; pnce or 
inpUIS Oucw;stc:s, subjtel to nlllural dlSIISitTS 
Seasolality of business; diffic:uh to &tt stock of illpii.S; price or 
im>UIS !luelllall:S; subiect to dl$eases and ruatural disa$lerS 
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C. Loan Process Highlights 
). POs seek OU\ 111()\Uld SG"/• of cuslometS. The n:s1 come \0 \he branch. There is a far 
higher rejection rate nnlong potential client:> who approach MELA POs visit the 
busirt= at different limes (mostly between 3 tlJld 4 times) before making a loan. 
Y It takes, on average. around one monlb from the lime of tile loan application until the 
money is disbu~ (llS!>-uming that the loan is less than TkSO,OOO and does not have to 
go to tiler lead Office, which adds another montll) 
> The Tk50,000 ceiling on IQan approvals at tile district level cause most loans to be 
made a1 Tk50,000 or be\ow. 
> Largc!r loans take between one week and four weeks to gel approved by bead-office. 
This is, in part, becaUSil head-office rcqueSlS additional information about the 
business and the borrower The g;tlhering of legal documents (e.g.. for collatentl) and 
the registratiou of the propeny usually takes another I 0 days. 
D. Loan Structuring 
);- Loans are not structured according to business's needs. POs make 'cookie culler" 
loans that are mostly for 12 months. 
> Decisions to increase the \oan si:z.e or the duration of the \oan term are often not 
related to eithcr the nature of business. tile borrower's ability to handle cash. of the 
actual cash flow that tile business generates. 
Y No CI1Sh flow based lending is taking place, although POs do cbeci. tile income 
streamS that the borrowers receive. Loan officer IJ'Oining, and on tile job support from 
trained District Managers should help overcome this problem. 
E. Repeat Borrowers 
}> District Managers believe that the repca1 borrower rate is around 80% The MIS data 
shows il is \ower. (40o/• or \bose bo!TO\IICrs who cou\d take out a second \oan are 
choosing not to do so, creating n repeat borrower mte of about 60%). 
~ Rcpe31 borrowers requiring substantially ISfllcr 10311 sizes nrc aU in till! productive 
sector: food processing. textile and the cottage industry businesses 
F. Missed Opportunities 
I" The development impact potential of MELA is lin1ited due tile lack of a strategy and 
direc1ion from the head-office level. The primary message that MELA staJT receives 
is: a} to gel volume up and b) to kee:p delitlqtlCilCy down. And since there is an 
'invisible C3p' on loans nt Tk.SO,OOO, the only v.ay to get vo\\1meup is to lend \0 
many businesses quickly. Hence the emphasis on grocery stores, etc. 
Productive busin=, where they are being sought out, could absorb larger BnlOUnts 
of capital and generate many more net new jobs than tlley are able to with tile smaller 
loan smounts. At least half tile District Managers said that lhcy could disburse sixty 
Tk I 00,000 loans witllin o year, yet far fewer nre bctng made. This is o c-.uch-22 
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situation as, on the one hand, I'Os should ideally be trained in cash llow based 
lending before they can take on these larger loans. Yet, witb the stringent collateral 
requirementS demanded by the MELA program, they could certainly already be 
making some or these loans. 
> Related to the above (i.e. MELA PO$ cl\llsing any and all bu.sinesses actou lh~ board 
with no strategy). they are not developing depth exp¢Jtise in paniculnr productive 
sectors. This is a lost opportunity. 
Having sectional expertise will: a) lessen the portfolio risk as lenders come to bcuer 
understand the business and its potenual better and can make a beuer lending 
decision; b) help the borrower who will benefit from the lender's increased expertise 
and advice; c) increase productivity as the lender will take a shorter time if he/she 
knows the sector well, d) increase loan volume as, it is likely that the lender will be 
tess aftuid to make larger loans when he/she understands the risk better; e) increase 
development impact, and I) increase branch pro fils as a result of greater efficiency 
and reduced delinquency. 
> l'Os who are in5lructed only to lend against substantial collateraltgnore marty good 
businesses run by people who have recently migrated to an area and do not own land 
(collateral}. \Ve believe that the amount of coiJattral demanded at this stage is 
ncessive, especially for smal\er non-Membtt lo;ms. Once BRAC's lending omcen 
can do cash-flow based lending, the need for collateral is fur less. 
~ Around 30% of the RDP lmmches are oot ideally located tO reach MELA borrowers 
within a 15 km radius. It is likely that 'good' businesses are overlooked as a n:suiL 
Either motorbikes in high potential areas or additional POs can adJress this. 
;;.. Shorter-tenn se:lSOnal loans for borrowers wbo require cash for shorter periods (e.g. 6 
to 8 months) will expand BRAC's borro''"-er base in the agro sector. 
)> The lower than expected repeat borrower rate (discussed earlier) is clearly a lost 
Opporttmity in terms Of earnings and development impac.t. 
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Footnotes 
1 Oiven thalli often tllkes J-6 months until• new M£LA branch nlAL.c:s the lim MEI.A loan, Utis method of 
aging MELA bram:hes acwally unclenlate$ Uu: .ctual age ofllu: branch significantly. 
1 T1w'e is 50me c:onfUlion on lht: ~ gtOUpt'oon.wget gtoup designation that should be clarified. 
J\vcording to Uu: MIS IC1EI.A records, lbetl: are 87 sep:~.ralc borrower:s tbllt ovu time been dassif!W as both 
llltgl:l group liS well aJ non-taJVt group. 77 of 1hese memben Sll!lted as wgtl group and lhcn for the m:.<l 
Joan "<re re-dassified as non-taft.~t @IOU\'· This may not be al:ssue of consequence. but ~hould be 
examined For loan uaeking and repeat borrm.cr anJiysis purposes. this h not a l.ey issue. for the borrower 
still maintd their dislinc~ branell and member~ 
'MELA ~agcmcn~ must develop the CBp:!.City to !liRa copy of the clmbase (.dbO tiles fl'O<l• MIS 
depart~ open..l\d w.e \1\all\1<: in Ex.:cl. w \hen~ \1\e PMIITab\e tmd otbet tool~ or Eltccl u. 
allllyze tmlds, dusteB. concemratiom., and ratios. ~cellw IIIOre than adequate c:Jpactty for tbts tasl., 
lllld 5hould be URd 10 liS fulles~to produce analyses, repottS, 11-' rcpons and other W&e:led .,Wyses 
Analysis should be done 0<1 indlvidualloat1. bnnch, district and Stttor (schtme code) lc•els. Unlil.e the VO 
lcnlling Pf"Otlllm, MEtA Manag«:lh<ullllll)\ deYelop lhc: c:apaclt) 10 -aeate "Teal ~~~ lllllli)'>CS of \he 
MELA pOnfolio.lfllllf(et and sec:tonl eoodrtions, and wxiCBtand the d<ata commg to from the fiCid on a 
C~JtTent basis. not wailing just for rcporu from the MIS dep;snment, although lheiT ~11ndardiwl reports 
have their sp«ifiC role and iTnpor1antt 
•These rtp0rt5 shoulcl be~c bOlh on an pm:cnrage antlabso\UkTan bosh. To saYespKe. only !he 
~lllge bnsed repof\S arc shown in lhrsl~ing. 
These repons should be done both "'ith quanerly and monthly dclail To save space. only quanerly 
reports arc shown here. 
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